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•  It can be seen that some of the tasks added to the menu of things to be done 
by the FCs seem to be of a temporary or ad-hoc/ contingent nature. Using 
the same instrumentality for solving multiple problems may be convenient but 
may lead to problems of coherence and accountability.  
•  It is to be recommended that the FCs ought to be set up (in the core sense) 
for a period of five years and not only give out a one time award but also 
monitor the performance and dynamically release funds overtime. The 
point about ‘monitoring’ the fiscal reforms program and that of ‘linking the 
grants devolved to implementation’ is vital to the success of the translating the 
recommendations made by the FC into practice.     
•  The practice of using the 1971 population was initiated some time ago (4
th 
FC) needs to be changed. Given that population has been used as an indicator 
of ‘need/ adequacy’ of a state, denying resources to the state on this front would 
lead to a distortion in the allocation pattern. Since use of 1971 population is a 
part of the TOR of the present Commission, it may not pot possible for the 
present Commission to go against it and use 2001 population but it is certainly 
within the purview of the Commission to recommend such a change.  
•  Some preliminary and general points about the task ahead of 13
th FC: 
1.  The FC has been asked to estimate the requirements of the Center. This 
is crucial and something that has not been attempted explicitly by 
the earlier finance commissions.  
2.  The FC is to look at the ecology and climate change issues. This is a 
case where the underlying issue is of great importance however, 
whether it should be looked at by the FC is a moot point.  
3.  Provision of adequate maintenance grants for committed plan schemes is 
a very important issue in the TOR. This again brings into sharp focus 
the need to review the artificial dichotomies of plan/non-plan and 
revenue/capital entities. 
4.  As regards the normative approach followed by earlier FCs deserves to 
be commended. However, it needs to be checked out whether the 
effort really is worth it in terms of results. Perhaps even more 
sophistication in working out these norms is called for.  
•  Inclusion is rightly underlined in all policy pronouncements. This implies, 
greater weight needs to be to be given to health and education in a targeted and 
performance based manner. However, it is crucial that the growth (even when 
somewhat exclusionary in character) has to be sustained, with the further 
implication that the design of any policy strategy must have incentive 
compatibility meaningfully as its cornerstone. •  The current political scenario as a biting constraint has to be firmly kept in 
mind.  The autonomy will perforce be required to be circumscribed by 
observable ‘good conduct’ by the states. The implication is that the margin 
of bargain in the non-formula based transfers will be up for grabs and be 
available on purely party political expediencies. 
•  The fiscal situation of the states presents a different (improved) picture as 
compared to the one that presented itself at the onset of the 12
th FC largely due 
to growth dividend. There are some problems though, the debt, (outstanding 
liabilities, to use the RBI nomenclature) has increased by around 9 
percentage points from around 31 to around 40%. This is worrisome and the 
13
th FC clearly has its work cut out. The implications (of revenue deficit cap) 
for expenditures on the crucial sectors of health and education (both 
essentially state subjects) will require to be watched closely.  
•  The spirit of 73
rd and 74
th Constitutional Amendments required simultaneous 
transfer of functions as well as empowerment of the local governments. This 
unfortunately has not happened. It is by now well-known that the State Finance 
Commissions (SFCs) are set up – as constitutionally mandated – but then the 
awards are all but forgotten. The non-synchronic setting up of SFCs and non-
uniform treatment by different state governments has meant that they are 
not useful as providers of inputs to the Central Finance Commissions. The 
trick lies in linking ‘agent-purposive’ transfers with observable indicators 
amounting to a sort of administrative arm-twisting.  
•  Great level of effective effort at capacity building (training and absorptive 
capacity) and reforms (process reengineering) are required. But there is good 
argument in favor of just devolving funds with implicit faith, that the 
capacity will be created. While recognizing the need and the efforts that need 
to be taken for capacity building, it is not necessary to treat it as an essential 
prerequisite. This would require well funded institution building and financing 
such a thing will be well worth looking into by the FC. 
•  The time has come to move from macro-level indicators to design parameters 
at micro level. The quality of expenditure and delivery needs to be vetted 
through an autonomous well funded agency. Also an effort has to be made to 
compute the normative need of local bodies just as the earlier FC had done in 
the case of States. Perhaps the 13
th FC needs to facilitate setting up of 
institutions (monitoring observatories/ data warehouses) afresh or help 
create them virtually by culling the elements from the existing ones 
(research institutes/universities).  
•  The non-synchronous temporal tenures of the two commissions will lead to 
several problems and issues. The prevailing practice of treating Plan and Non-
Plan requirements of the states by the Planning Commission and the Finance 
Commission has led to the inability to take a coordinated and holistic view. The 
Finance commission will have to put up a strong fight for the territory that is 
in danger of being encroached upon. This is important since, the politically 
weighted Planning Commission recommendations have implications in the 
domain of concern of the FC.  
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incentive compatibility (IC) in contracts/relations must assume primacy. Given 
the political economy considerations however, it may be more realistic to 
pursue one sided IC System, i.e., where we ignore the penal clause. It is 
important to remember that application of this principle presumes the existence 
of ‘competitive equality’ in terms of capacities. A proper policy mix has to be 
evolved to bring about equalization in the dynamic sense (and in terms of both 
stocks and flows) so that over a period there is a convergence. 
•  The weight assigned to the ‘distance’ criterion needs to be reduced. In order to 
push for a greater space for efficiency whilst keeping in view equity and 
adequacy, it may be prudent to get back the recently discarded ‘inverse 
distance’ criterion. A more radical suggestion will be to take the cause of 
decentralization seriously and treat district as a primary unit for administration, 
use the distance criterion at the level of district level income. This is 
pertinent since the macro level caps (on say the revenue deficits) lead to less 
than optimal expenditure on public goods in the poorer parts of the state.  
•  There is a perception that states and the lower governments are unable to 
competently discharge the functions assigned to them. This has led to – amongst 
other things – allocation being altered so as to make the funds for the program 
directly or on shared basis. Over the past few FCs, the share of transfers as a 
proportion of the total transfers has shown a monotonic increase. Given that 
constraints can be imposed only on the transfer component rather than the 
statutory tax sharing one, it is but natural that this component will increase. The 
trick here is to have a self binding commitment in terms of upper bound on 
the proportion to be so disbursed and then work in as detailed a way to tie 
the transfers to ‘good governance’ articulated in observable indicators.  
•  In case of GST, the 13
th FC has to apply itself seriously and scientifically to 
study (in a scenario framework) the revenue implications of different 
reasonable rates at the central and state levels and come up with ceilings 
and floors (especially for the states). Implications will also have to be 
worked out about the extent to which the hands of the state governments 
can be tied (thereby reducing their autonomy). 
•  The current growth is essentially driven by urban agglomerations. The FC must 
also do its bit so that an act of omission on its part does not lead to killing the 
golden goose! Such transfers to the local bodies in the areas must be fully 
incentive-compatible, and they must meet the rigorous standards of 
rationalization of user fees, demand recovery and expenditure efficiency. 
•  Two of the important issues that should have found an explicit place in the TOR 
of the 13
th FC are the impact of the Sixth Pay Commission and Royalties 
payable to the States. In the name of fairness, it is essential that proper 
compensation be paid to the States on count of natural resources.  
•  Finally, to return to a familiar theme of governance, in all that FC does, even 
more important than the resources, will be the ability to design transfers within 
an operational framework of good governance. ‘Once the wholesale reforms 
by way of prerequisites have been accomplished, what is important is to get 
urgently into the business of reform agenda concerned with the micro-design’.  
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Shallow people demand variety, but I have been 
writing the same story all my life; 





I.  Introduction 
 
With the regularity of the proverbial ‘rainy season’, the Presidential Order 
constituting the 13
th Central Finance Commission has been issued. Whilst the seasons 
have somewhat lost their regularity – what with ecological and climate change (which 
is a part of 13
th FC’s ToR) – it is to the credit of the strength of Indian democracy and 
the sanctity of her Constitution that its writ is strictly followed. It is also a sign of 
maturing democracy that it is – along with other events like the Central Budget – not 
accompanied with much fanfare, but rather treated as a routine affair, as a part of the 
process! The 13
th FC has an advantage as well as a challenging task. Advantage, 
because it is able to stand on the shoulders of the commissions that have gone by, a 
challenge because it has to measure up to and indeed try to better, especially the twelfth 
finance commission report, which to my mind is in the nature of locus classicus!  
This paper has been organized in six sections, including this one. In the next 
section I will provide a brief backdrop of the ToRs of the earlier finance commissions, 
in the third section I will argue that the parametric environment presented by the Indian 
economy and polity has undergone a rather dramatic change. After reproducing the 
ToR for the 13
th FC – for ready reference – in the fourth section, in the fifth section I 
will flag some issues for consideration of the commission. In the final section I will 
conclude. 
                                                 
ℑ Sincere thanks are due to Shri. Sharad Kale, Shri. D.M. Sukhtankar and to my friend Dr. Chandrahas 
Deshpande for suggesting and encouraging me to write and then commenting on the draft of this 
discussion paper and showing confidence in my ability to deliver. Closer home, I wish to record my 
sincere thanks for the comments by Professor J.C .Sandesara. Finally, I wish to record my appreciation of 
my departmental colleague and ‘constant co-author’, Dr. Mala Lalvani who has some how escaped this 
time around, but did not escape doing all those little things that finally add up to a lot! The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
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II. A Brief Review of the TORs of the Earlier Finance Commissions  
  The TOR of a Finance Commission defines the mandate of the Finance 
Commission that is binding on the Commission. Hence any critical appraisal of the 
recommendations made by the FCs should necessarily start with a close look at the 
TORs of the various FCs. A brief review of the TORs of the earlier Finance 
Commissions which have made their recommendations, as has been attempted here, 
would enable us to put in perspective the recommendations made by these FCs and also 
enable us to take a more holistic view of the scope of the FCs and the transition it has 
undergone since when the First Commission was constituted by an Order dated 22nd 
November, 1951. The major (core) functions of the Finance Commissions listed under 
Article 280 of the Constitution are as follows: 
(i)  Distribution between the Union and the States of the net proceeds of taxes which 
are to be may be divided between them and the allocation between the States of the 
respective shares of such proceeds.  
(ii)  Listing out the principles that should govern the grants-in-aid of the revenues of 
the States out of the Consolidated Fund of India under Article 275 of the 
Constitution.  
(iii) The continuance or modification of the terms of any agreement entered into by the 
Government of India with the Government of any State. 
  In the interest of sound finance the First FC was asked to examine and 
make recommendations on: 
(a) Grants-in-aid to the states of Assam, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal in lieu of share 
of the net proceeds in each year of the export duty on jute and jute products to these 
states in accordance with the provisions of Article 273 of the Constitution.  
(b) Grants-in-aid of their revenues to states under Article 275 of the Constitution.  
The 2
nd FC while making its recommendations for grants-in-aid under Article 275 was 
asked to consider  
(i)  The requirements of the Second Five Year Plan, and 
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sources available to them. 
The FC was also to make recommendations regarding  
(1) The principles which should govern the distribution under article 269 of the net 
proceeds of estate duty in respect of property other than agricultural land, levied by the 
Government of India in the States within which such duty is leviable; and  
(2) The modifications, if any, in the rates of interest and the terms of repayment of the 
loans made to the various States by the Government of India between 5th August, 1947 
and the 31
st March, 1956. The following two matters were added to the terms of 
reference and the FC was asked to make recommendations regarding:   
(3) The principles that should govern the distribution among the states of the  net 
proceeds of the additional duty of excise on mill made textiles, sugar and tobacco. 
The right to tax these commodities was surrendered by the states in 1957. The Central 
Government agreed to levy additional excise duty on this count and distribute it among 
the states.   
(4) The principles that should govern the distribution, under Article 269 of the grants to 
states in lieu of the repealed tax on railway fares.  
In addition to the duties assigned to the first two FCs, the TOR of the 3
rd FC 
was entrusted with distribution amongst states of the Rs.12.5 crores which the Railways 
had agreed to pay to the General Revenues every year consequent on the decision taken 
to merge the tax on Railway Fares with the passenger fares and repeal the Railway 
Passenger Fares Act, 1957.         
The TOR of the 4
th FC listed out in much greater detail the considerations that 
the FC needed to base its recommendations on. The TOR of the 4
th FC for the very first 
time specified that efficiency considerations be given some weight. The FC was asked 
to consider the scope for economy consistent with efficiency, which may be effected 
by the States in their administrative expenditure. 
  The TOR of the 5
th FC in addition to all the previous tasks, also asked the 
Commission to make recommendations on the problem of unauthorized over-drafts of 
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such overdrafts. In keeping with the TOR the previous Commission, this TOR too 
asked the FC was asked to give consideration to the scope for better fiscal management 
as also for economy consistent with efficiency which may be effected by the states in 
their administrative, maintenance and other developmental expenditure. The TOR of 
this Commission departed from previous ones on two counts. First, it asked the FC to 
make an interim report and a final one. Second, it explicitly specified the need for 
transparency as it said that that the final report must indicate the basis on which it had 
arrived at its findings and make available the relevant documents.   
  The TOR of the 6
th FC added to the responsibilities of the FC by explicitly 
asking it to consider the requirements of states which are backward in standards of 
general administration for upgrading the administration with a view to bringing it to the 
levels obtaining in the more advanced states over a period of 10 years. It continued the 
focus on the aspect of fiscal management as well as efficiency that had been initiated in 
the TOR of the 4
th FC. 
The TOR of the 6
th FC specifically asked the FC to make an assessment of the 
non-plan capital gap of the States on a uniform and comparable basis for the five years.  
The Commission could then undertake a general review of the States' debt position and 
provide relief or suggest corrective measures. 
Yet another extension in the scope of the 6
th FC was that the TOR stated that the 
Commission may review the policy and arrangements in regard to the financing of 
relief expenditure by the States affected by natural calamities and examine the 
feasibility of establishing a National Fund to which the Central and State Governments 
may contribute a percentage of their revenue-receipts. 
The 7
th FC TOR, in addition to all the requirements spelled out by the previous 
TORs, made the additional point that the in making its recommendations on the various 
matters, the Commission should adopt the population figures of 1971 in all cases 
where population is regarded as a factor for determination of devolution of taxes and 
duties and grants-in-aid.   
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th FC made no new changes to the responsibilities and tasks 
assigned to the FC. It asked for continuation in the use of 1971 population figures. 
  The TOR of the 9
th FC went off the beaten track and for the first time 
introduced the concept of adopting a ‘normative approach’. It stated that in making its 
recommendations, the Commission should: 
(i) Adopt a normative approach in assessing the receipts and expenditures on the 
revenue account of the States and the Center and, in doing so, keep in view the special 
problems of each State, if any, and the special requirements of the Center such as 
defence, security, debt servicing and other committed expenditure or liabilities. 
(ii) Have due regard to the need for providing adequate incentives for better resource 
mobilisation and financial discipline as well as closer linking of expenditure and 
revenue raising decisions.  
(iii) Take into account the need for speed, efficiency and effectiveness of Government 
functioning and of delivery systems for Government programs and  
(iv) Keep in view the objective of not only balancing the receipts and expenditure on 
revenue account of both the States and the Center, but also generating surpluses for 
capital investment.    
  The TOR of the 9
th FC was unique in that it enhanced the scope of the FC 
significantly. It was the very first one to have spoken on the role of FCs to provide 
‘incentives’, to ensure closer linking of revenues and expenditures and in attempting to 
attain efficiency in the delivery system of government programs. 
   The TOR of the 10
th FC made the following additions to the considerations that 
the FC needed to keep in mind while making recommendations: 
(i) The requirements of States for modernisation of administration, e.g. computerisation 
of land records and providing faster channels of communication up to and above district 
level, and for upgrading the standards in non-developmental sectors and services, and 
the manner in which such expenditure can be monitored; 
(ii) The requirements of the States for meeting the non-Plan revenue expenditure also 
keeping in view the potential for raising additional taxes. 
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th FC added the new dimension of entrusting the FC to 
review the state of the finances of the Union and the States and suggest ways and 
means by which the governments, could collectively and independently bring about a 
restructuring of the public finances so as to restore budgetary balance and maintain 
macro-economic stability. The FC was asked to keep in mind the need for generating 
surpluses for capital investment and reduce fiscal deficit. The Commission was also 
expected keep in mind the requirement of states for up-gradation of standards in non-
developmental and social sectors and services, particularly in the backward states. The 
TOR of the 11
th FC for the first time mentioned the need to give significant weight to 
‘incentives’ for better realization of tax and non-tax revenues.    
Since the 11
th FC was to be setup after the passage of the 73
rd and 74
th 
Constitutional Amendment Acts, which gave local bodies legal status, the TOR of the 
11
th FC for the first time asked the FC to examine the finances of local bodies. More 
specifically it said that the FC needed to consider the following: 
(a) The measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement 
the resources of the Panchayats and Municipalities in the State on the basis of the 
recommendations made by the State Finance Commission. 
(b) Where the State Finance Commissions had not been constituted as yet, or have not 
submitted their report giving recommendations, the FC was expected to make its own 
assessment about the manner and extent of augmentation of Consolidated Fund of the 
State to supplement the resources of the Panchayats and Municipalities in the State.  
The TOR also stated that the Commission may make an assessment of the debt 
position of the States as on 31st March, 1999 and suggest corrective measures keeping in 
view the long term sustainability for both the Center and the States.  
  The TOR to the 11
th FC assigned the FC the additional task of drawing up a 
monitorable fiscal reforms programme aimed at reduction of revenue deficit of the 
state and recommend the manner in which the grants to states to states to cover the 
assessed deficit in their non-plan revenue account may be linked to progress in 
implementing the programme. 
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core issues of determining tax devolution and grants, the TOR of the 12
th FC expresses 
concern about the rapidly deteriorating fiscal scenario.  
In keeping with the TOR of the 11
th FC, that of the 12
th FC also stated that the 
Commission shall review the state of finances of Union and state governments and 
suggest a plan to restructure public finances, restore budgetary balance, achieve 
macroeconomic stability and debt reduction. The TOR of the 12
th FC, however, also 
emphasizes ‘equitable growth’. The TOR for the first time asks the FC to give weight 
to tax efforts of central and state governments as against targets, if any, and the 
potential for additional resource mobilization in order to improve the tax-GDP and 
tax-GSDP ratio. The FC has also been asked to review the Fiscal Reform Facility 
introduced by the central government on the basis of recommendations made by the 
11
th FC and suggest measures for effective achievement of its objectives.  
Like the previous FCs, the 12
th FC too has been asked to make an assessment of 
the debt position of the States, suggest such corrective measures consistent with macro-
economic stability and debt sustainability. It has, for the first time, however, elaborated 
on the factors that need to be given weight to in this context. The FC has been asked to 
give weight to the performance of the States in the fields of human development and 
investment climate.  A review of the TORs of the twelve FCs clearly show that over 
the years the canvas of operations of the FCs has widened from simply being a 
body set up every five years with the sole objective of devolving funds to sub-
national governments, to that which comprehensively assesses the financial 
situation (macro-stability) of the economy as a whole and charts out a roadmap 
for the restructuring the finances. Over the period consideration of efficiency was 
added quite early on and later – post 73
rd and 74
th Constitutional Amendments – 
local bodies came into reckoning, clearly underlining the seriousness of intent vis-
à-vis decentralization. It can be seen that some of the tasks added to the menu of 
things to be done by the FCs seem to be of a temporary or ad-hoc/ contingent 
nature. This is not particularly welcome. The aims and objectives of the FCs ought to 
be sharply focused and hence delimited, which will add value of its awards. Using the 
same instrumentality for solving multiple problems may serve convenience but may 
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a casualty. The example of calamities funds readily comes to mind. This ought to be 
avoided. The position of the 12
th FC on this matter is well articulated and entirely 
reasonable. Since this matter – as we shall see in the next section – appears in the ToR 
of the 13
th FC, I would suggest that it could go into a detailed study of the potential 
likelihood of calamities in an actuarial mode looking at the historical data and 
modify the scheme somewhat using insurance principles, complete with the bonus 
for non-claims.  
The TOR of the 11
th FC marked a crucial departure from its predecessors in the 
role envisaged for the FCs by asking it to draw up a “monitor-able” fiscal reforms 
program aimed at reduction in revenue deficits and also the manner in which grants 
could be linked to implementation of the reform program (acknowledged ‘best 
practice’).  This is indeed commendable. However it raises the question of ‘who will 
monitor?’. It is to be recommended that the FCs ought to be set up for a period of five 
years and not only give out a one time award but also monitor the performance and 
dynamically release funds overtime. The TOR of the 12
th FC, however, does not make 
an explicit mention of this task of the FC.  The point about ‘monitoring’ the fiscal 
reforms program and that of ‘linking the grants devolved to implementation’ is, 
according to us, vital to the success of the translating the recommendations made by the 
FC into practice. Hence, even though the TOR of a FC does not make explicit mention 
of it, it is imperative that the FC keeps them in mind while making its 
recommendations.     
The practice of using the 1971 population was initiated so as to not reward the 
states which failed in population control has continued ever since it was initiated by 4
th 
FC and is specified even in the TOR of the 12
th FC. We agree with Kumar and Vemuri 
(2002) who have rightly pointed out that if the effectiveness of the adopted strategy is 
to be assessed solely in terms of denying the states with higher rates of population 
growth the benefit of a larger proportion of resources then the policy of use of 1971 
population has been successful.  However, given that population has been used as an 
indicator of ‘need/ adequacy’ of a state, denying resources to the state on this front 
would lead to a distortion in the allocation pattern in terms of the actual requirement of 
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pointed out that the use of 1971 population by the 11
th FC denied a greater share to four 
of the least developed states viz, U.P, M.P., Bihar, Rajasthan and north-eastern states. 
Thus, although the mandate of the 12
th FC was to use the 1971 population figures, we 
would have liked the Commission to take a close look at the gainers and losers on 
account of this provision by computing the allocations under two scenarios, (i) that of 
using 1971 population and (ii) that using the latest 2001 population figure. It is now 
hoped that the 13
th FC will do the needful. This would be a positive step forward in the 
working of the entire process of Finance Commission devolutions. Indeed, it is 
regrettable that the same norm continues to be imposed even in the ToR of the 13
th FC. 
This does not really serve the purpose for which it is supposedly enunciated and indeed 
goes against the tenets of equity to the extent that it mis-estimates the ‘need’. This is 
akin to the sanctions being imposed on a State leading to punishment being imposed on 
the vulnerable citizens. After all they too are Indian citizens and as such entitled to the 
same standard of services. In order to substantiate the point somewhat – without going 
into detailed exercise – I have presented the relevant data in Appendix III, which 
clearly indicates the extent to which the pattern of population has undergone a change. 
In sum, the review of the ToRs of the earlier Finance Commissions indicate that 
the tasks have been cumulatively been increasing. To the extent that these are in 
response to the changes macro-environment and/or management paradigm they are 
understandable. In this category we would put the influx of the limited concern for 
incentive compatibility as well as the sense of macro-stability and indeed the concern 
for decentralization. However, when this is due to contingent and temporary reasons 
and clearly outside the purview of the core functions of the Finance Commission they 
only make the work more complex – with multi-objective setting – even at the 
conceptual level and clearly need to be avoided. 
III. Terms of Reference of the Thirteenth Finance Commission & Some 
Observations 
 1. The Commission shall make recommendations as to the following matters, namely:- 
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which are to be, or may be, divided between them under Chapter I   Part XII of the 
Constitution and the allocation between the States of the respective shares of such 
proceeds; 
(ii)    the principles which should govern the grants-in-aid of the revenues of the States 
out of the Consolidated Fund of India and the sums to be paid to the States which are in 
need of assistance by way of grants-in-aid of their revenues under article 275 of the 
Constitution for purposes other than those specified in the provisos to clause (1) of that 
article; and 
(iii)    the measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement 
the resources of the Panchayats and Municipalities in the State on the basis of the 
recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State. 
2.          The Commission shall review the state of the finances of the Union and the 
States, keeping in view, in particular, the operation of the States’ Debt Consolidation 
and Relief Facility 2005-2010 introduced by the Central Government on the basis of the 
recommendations of the Twelfth Finance Commission, and suggest measures for 
maintaining a stable and sustainable fiscal environment consistent with equitable 
growth.   
 3.          In making its recommendations, the Commission shall have regard, among 
other considerations, to - 
(i)      The resources of the Central Government, for five years commencing on 1st 
April 2010, on the basis of levels of taxation and non-tax revenues likely to be 
reached at the end of 2008-09; 
(ii)       The  demands  on  the  resources  of the Central Government, in particular, on 
account of the projected Gross Budgetary Support to the Central and State Plan, 
expenditure on civil administration, defence, internal  and border security, debt-
servicing and other committed expenditure and liabilities; 
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April 2010, on the basis of levels of taxation and non-tax revenues likely to be 
reached at the end of 2008-09;  
(iv)     The objective of not only balancing the receipts and expenditure on revenue 
account of all the States and the Union, but also generating surpluses for capital 
investment;  
(v)      The taxation efforts of the Central Government and each State Government and 
the potential for additional resource mobilization to improve the tax-Gross 
Domestic Product ratio in the case of the Union and tax-Gross State Domestic 
Product ratio in the case of the States;  
(vi)     The impact of the proposed implementation of Goods and Services Tax with 
effect from 1
st April, 2010, including its impact on the country’s foreign trade; 
(vii)     The need to improve the quality of public expenditure to obtain better outputs 
and outcomes; 
(viii)    The need to manage ecology, environment and climate change consistent with 
sustainable development; 
(ix)     The expenditure on the non-salary component of maintenance and upkeep of 
capital assets and the non-wage related maintenance expenditure on plan 
schemes to be completed by  31st March, 2010 and the norms on the basis of 
which specific amounts are recommended for the maintenance of the capital 
assets and the manner of monitoring such expenditure;  
(x)       The  need  for  ensuring  the  commercial viability of irrigation projects, power 
projects, departmental undertakings and public sector enterprises through 
various means, including levy of user charges and adoption of measures to 
promote efficiency. 
  
4.         In making its recommendations on various matters, the Commission shall take 
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for determination of devolution of taxes and duties and grants-in-aid.  
5.         The Commission may review the present arrangements as regards financing of 
Disaster Management with reference to the National Calamity Contingency Fund and 
the Calamity Relief Fund and the funds envisaged in the Disaster Management Act, 
2005(53 of 2005),  and make appropriate recommendations thereon. 
6.         The Commission shall indicate the basis on which it has arrived at its findings 
and make available the estimates of receipts and expenditure of the Union and each of 
the States. 
7.          The Commission shall make its report available by the 31
st day of October, 
2009, covering the period of five years commencing on the 1
st day of April, 2010. 
 
  While the comments and suggestions/ issues arising from the task given to the 
13
th FC will be found in various places in what follows I would make some preliminary 
and general points at this stage. The core mandate of the Commission to determine the 
sharing the tax revenues between Center and the States is a largely settled issue (see, 
Mythili Bhusnurmath, 2007) and hence not much may be said about it except that given 
the current conjuncture, the share may be marginally increased. Section  1. (ii) and 
1.(iii) are extremely important and will be elaborated later in this paper. In 3 (ii) of the 
ToR the FC has been asked to estimate the requirements of the Center. This is crucial 
and something that has not been attempted explicitly by the earlier finance 
commissions. This is clearly important in the present context where there will be 
pressure to increase the states’ share in the overall devolution. Section 3 (viii) requires 
the FC to look at the ecology and climate change issues. This is a case where the 
underlying issue is of great importance however, whether it should be looked at by 
the FC is a moot point (see, EPW, 2007). The issue is of global magnitude and requires 
a policy environment on which the call has to taken the Central Government at the 
highest level in consonance with States in a a-party political manner. A separate high 
powered committee (which includes technical specialists) needs to be appointed to 
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within broad pre-decided parameters. Also, a great deal of coordination and consonance 
between the FC recommendations and the Central Policy at large has to be ensured. The 
example of center’s distortionary fuel pricing policy allowing the dismantled 
administered price framework to work itself back ‘in an even more virulent form’ 
hardly fills one with confidence. Loading the FC with this work will deflect from the 
core issues to the detriment of the quality of report (much the same is true about 
requiring the FC to work out impact of GST on foreign trade). Section 3 (ix) deals with 
a very important issue of providing maintenance grants for committed plan schemes. 
Here, the transfers have to adequate, keeping in view the threshold concept, to 
neutralize the general tendency (leading to inefficiency) of leaning towards ‘ribbon 
cutting activities’. This again brings into sharp focus the need to review the somewhat 
artificial dichotomies of plan/non-plan and revenue/capital entities. 
  As far as sections 4 and 5 of the ToR are concerned, I see nothing that makes 
me feel the need to revise the comments in the context of earlier FCs, if anything they 
hold with greater force. Except that in case of 13
th FC the use of 2001 figures of 
population for some purposes should be expanded. Again, to avoid the gap-filling 
mandate degenerating into a mere exercise in dentistry, the normative approach 
followed by the 12
th FC deserves to be commended. Although introduced by the 9
th 
Finance Commission for the first time, 12
th FC has introduced an element of 
sophistication. However, it needs to be checked out whether the effort really is worth it 
in terms of results. Perhaps even more sophistication – whilst keeping the underlying 
principle intact – in working out these norms is called for. A small exercise to check out 
how reality has panned out vis-à-vis projections clearly indicates (for two years) that 
the RMSPEs are rather large as may be seen from the following table. The notable 
feature is that for revenues, the growth dividends have helped keep the RMSPE low 
but for ‘Expenditures’ – which are the ‘control’, variable – it is rather large. The 
‘Deficits’ have gone awry. The state-wise list is presented in Annexure II. There are 
lessons to be taken away by the 13
th FC. Perhaps I may leave this section with a 
comment – without elaboration – that apart from the North Eastern States (that are not 
very important in magnitudes) the main states that seem to be ‘different’ from the 
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West Bengal (seen in Appendix II). 
TABLE: TOTAL 28 States 
 
   Projections of 12th FC  Actuals   RMSPE 
    2005-06     2006-07     2005-06   
 2006-07  
(RE)    
 Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Receipts  244881.35 281867.38 259887.1 312313.24  8.01
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    308764.96 333995.91 366428.5 432289.46  19.55
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   
Deficit/surplus  -63883.64 -52128.51 -106541 -119976.22  49.00
 
IV.  The Changed Parametric Environment 
 
The ethos of Indian economy, society and polity have been undergoing a rapid 
change, thanks to the LPG processes set in motion some two decades ago. The macro-
management regimen has undergone significant change in the recent past. The present 
structure of Indian fiscal federalism was formed at a time when its economy was much 
less market oriented than today. At any rate it is well recognized that existing inter-
governmental arrangements are rarely a product of detailed analytical studies by 
economists or political scientists, but are the result of historical developments, 
including historical accidents (see Teresa Minassian 1997). It is thus unlikely that the 
same arrangements would be chosen if today the countries had the freedom to start 
from scratch. Some of the specifics that I believe are pertinent and relevant to the work 
of the 13
th Finance Commission. Intergovernmental transfers and reforms therein are 
taking place today in the context of political decentralization, changing as well as 
shrinking role of the government and recognition of local autonomy, at least for 
sometime with Central norms and mandates in place (see, Bird,R and C. Wallich 
1993). These provide points of departure and will need to be borne in mind whilst 
rendering the mandate given to the FC operational. 
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India is the flavor of the season. In recent times, the upswing in the secular rate 
of growth of the Indian economy, wherein it has managed to significantly break away 
from the ‘Hindu rate’ has had positive impact on the way in which India is perceived 
the world over. This feat is especially noteworthy because it has been achieved by a 
country whose democracy has been often characterized as a functioning anarchy. The 
current growth experience and its impact on the macro-level fiscal and income 
variables – in terms of the positive growth dividend – must finally put to rest all the 
anti-growth rhetoric. It is amply clear (in the context of growth scenario) that all the 
good things – in social sphere, in terms of inclusion – can now be realistically 
afforded by the Indian policy maker, perhaps for the first time! It is indeed necessary 
that we do something here especially given that the ‘poor’ states have remained ‘poor’ 
through this growth episode, with the inescapable conclusion that there is certainly an 
exclusionary sub-plot to this growth story. 
This has two implications, one, for purposes of satisfying the very important 
tenet of inclusion, greater weight needs to be to be given to health and education in a 
targeted and performance based manner. Two, it is crucial that the growth (even when 
somewhat exclusionary in character) has to be sustained, with the further implication 
that the design of any policy strategy must have incentive compatibility 




IV.2. Political  Scenario 
Although India has a federal structure albeit not in the classical sense (see Roy 
Ash Narain, 2007), it is essentially a Union with a strong centripetal bias with the 
constitution ensuring an overwhelming and overriding power to the central government. 
Yet the political scenario in recent times has been such that more and more ground has 
had to be yielded to the states. Indeed on every issue it has become necessary to talk to 
the states. The days of Congress domination are long past and coalitional politics are 
here to stay. The regional parties with there parochial agendas have been gaining 
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to name a few. A more recent trend has been emergence of strong local leaders even 
within the National Parties (witness the so called Mayawati, Modi phenomenon). All of 
this has meant that the dictat of the Central government will not necessarily be 
followed. This is quite different from the case of Argentina where macro-stability and 
other issues were taken care of because, not only was the national government able to 
set up hard budget constraints but partly also because it had a strong party control of 
both legislators at the Central level as well as at the level of sub-national governments 
(see, Dillinger, W and S. Webb (1999). Thus, the specific India political situation 
brings in a few problems in the context of transfers. This is also important because the 
most important public goods that need to be serviced – such as health and education 
– are largely provided by States and below. The autonomy will perforce be required to 
be circumscribed by observable ‘good conduct’, a phenomenon that had to be earlier 
encountered only in case of ‘rogue’ states. The continued fractured mandate (as far 
party political strength is concerned) means that the margin of bargain in the non-
formula based transfers will be up for grabs and be available on purely party political 
expediencies (see, Indira Rajaraman, 2007). I don’t need to elaborate on this given that 
one of the members of the 13
th FC happens to be Professor Indira Rajaramn who is 
clearly seized with the issue. This situation is potentially problematic and will have to 
be guarded against in the structure and content of transfer design. More than ever 
before the ‘political feasibility’ in a fractured and heterogeneous domain of Indian 
polity will present a biting constraint. It is perhaps well to remember that nature and 
politics abhor catastrophic jumps and move in small steps. 
 
IV.3.   Fiscal Situation of States 
The fiscal situation of the states presents a different picture as compared to the 
one that presented itself at the onset of the 12
th FC. The fiscal situation then was indeed 
very grim. Vijay Kelkar (2004) noted, ‘Despite energetic efforts by a series of 
governments the revenue deficit worsened from 3.3% of GDP in 1990-91 to 4.4% of 
GDP by 2003-04’. He further added that ‘The baseline projections do not assume that 
major tax reforms will come about. But they do assume the pace in policy and 
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The prospect of states hammering down revenue deficits in the wake of the known 
downward rigidities of revenue expenditure was deemed to be rather dim. Karnik Ajit, 
(2005) whilst believing the states to be in deep throes of fiscal crisis was even more 
emphatic, ‘Unless changes ushered in 2004-05 are further accelerated and spread across 
states, the hoped for permanent improvement in state finances may not materialize. We 
are afraid that the report of 12
th FC, while it is critical of current situation of state 
finances is rather sanguine about future prospects’. Kelkar (2004) clearly believes that 
it is much better to concentrate on revenue raising effort with its powerful side effect of 
strengthening state finances which is not the consequence of expenditure cuts.  
The growth dividend in the form of tax revenue buoyancy that has been 
witnessed recently has clearly had good effect on the fiscal situation of the states. It 
could also have marginally been helped by the simplification, leading to greater 
compliance as well as some improvement in tax administration. The fiscal situation 
across the States thus shows a marked improvement (which might be the reason for 
dropping a clause from the ToR this time around). This evident from the table in 
Appendix I. The revenue deficit has shown an average drop of 3% points and the 
overall GFD also shows a reduction. There are some notable ‘rogue’ exceptions. Also 
the debt, (outstanding liabilities, to use the RBI nomenclature) has increased by 
around 9 percentage points from around 31 to around 40% (see Appendix I). This 
is worrisome and the 13
th FC clearly has its work cut out. The revenue buoyancies 
apart, debt swap scheme and the general softening of interest rates has allowed the 
interest payments to be held at 18% of revenue expenditures on an average. 
Whereas the revenue buoyancies can at most be sustained, the fact that the 
proportion of state debt with the centre has come down from about 50% to 
around 22% recently thus putting a limit on the debt swaps, and the at the market 
level the softening of interest rates is not very likely, does not portend well for the 
future (for greater details see RBI (2007)). Thus, in the incremental sense the impact of 
all these relief factors would be considerably dimmed. In this context, the implications 
of holding the cap of revenue deficit for expenditures on the crucial (and 
necessary) sectors of health and education (both essential state subjects) will 
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neutralizing the negative impact on the ‘good’ revenue expenditures in this area will 
have to be exercised by the 13
th FC.  
 
IV.4  Stronger Intent of Decentralization 
In a liberalized environment, the role of the government in resource allocation 
will be smaller, with the relative role of the sub-national governments is set to increase 
rather than decline (see Govind Rao and Tapas Sen opt cit.). It is recognized that the 
central government can influence the decentralized delivery of goods and services 
through the setting of policy guidelines for this delivery, a transfer of resources to go to 
the sub-national governments to equalize their capacity to meet these mandates; and the 
ex-post use of the transfers to monitor the level and quality of services provided by 
lower levels of government (see Teresa Minassian opt cit). It is well known (see Oats, 
1972) that decentralized (local) levels of government should rely on taxes on immobile 
bases (property tax, user fees), middle level government (states) can make use of the 
incomes and sales to a limited extent but in a harmonized way. 
  The theoretical efficiency and welfare gains to be made from decentralization 
are well established for some time now (see e.g. Tiebout, (1961) and Oats, (1972)). 
However one needs to be mindful of the institutional and administrative capacity 
constraints among other things that undermine the actual operational aspects of 
decentralization (see e.g. Tanzi, 1996 and Prud’homme 1995). It then follows that in 
especially in countries like India that do not face serious macroeconomic crisis, 
decentralization of revenues and expenditure will require the active engagement of the 
Central government, both for management reasons as well as directing a concerted and 
coordinated efforts towards attaining national goals. 
  In the Indian context, decentralization was ‘always around but never invited in’! 
All this is supposed to have changed with the passage of 73
rd and 74
th Constitutional 
Amendments. The spirit of these amendments required simultaneous transfer of 
functions as well as empowerment of the local governments. This unfortunately has not 
happened. It is by now well-known that the State Finance Commissions (SFCs) are set 
up – as constitutionally mandated – but then the awards are all but forgotten, indeed 
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necessarily keeping in mind the skill sets required to do a competent job. Thus, the 
non-synchronic setting up of SFCs (even when they are set up) and non-uniform 
treatment by different state governments has meant that they are not useful as 
providers of inputs to the Central Finance Commissions. At the level of principle, 
decentralization was seen to be unanimously acceptable, yet at the real ground level the 
States have not decentralized in the true sense. Being the ‘creatures’ of the States, the 
local body governments (both urban and rural) having devolved the functions, have 
shied away from devolving either the requisite resources in a predictable and certain 
fashion or indeed enabling the local governments (especially in case of urban bodies) 
by vesting them with sufficient legislative powers to raise resources and hence 
strengthen themselves. In trying to get the States to transfer resources along with the 
functions the discretion with the States (in the use of the word ‘may’ rather than ‘shall’ 
has implied that as an act of omission or deliberate design, the 74
th Constitutional 
Amendment simply does not go far enough. The work of Ministries such as MoPR in 
trying to directly transferring the resources through treasury and banks is note-worthy; 
although not likely go down well with the States. Of course, that even within the band 
of possibilities, the local bodies have by and large not fully exploited the potential has 
not helped their cause. The finances of local bodies are not in great shape for urban 
local bodies and indeed are in a pathetic case for the PRIs (rural case) this further 
creates a problem for delivery of services (both the magnitude and quality). The long 
and tortuous route of Constitutional Amendment apart, the trick lies in linking 
‘agent-purposive’ transfers with observable indicators amounting to a sort of 
administrative arm-twisting.  I would say this in full realization of the fact that in a 
typical multi-level hierarchical system, tenet of efficiency demands that the ‘supremal’ 
unit must not talk directly to ‘infimal’ unit. The protocol of linear communication with 
the adjacent level units within the system, need to be strictly followed. This corrosion 
of the State autonomy is perhaps worth the price in the wake of possible improvement 
of the quality of expenditure and service delivery (to be audited by external 
autonomous agency). There are also, a host of best practices that are common 
knowledge and documented (see, 12
th FC Report, 2005) for the purposes of tying the 
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transmission of the resources onwards. There is also the trade off implicit here that the 
tied devolution will translate into some amount of unpredictability.  
Of course, for this to happen, great level of effective effort at capacity 
building (training and absorptive capacity) and reforms (process reengineering) 
are required. But there is good argument in favor of just devolving funds with 
faith, that the capacity will be created. After all, never in history has one found 
infrastructure being created fully, before the demand for it comes about due to 
growth. Indeed, it is growth that partly makes the provision of such infrastructure 
affordable. Thus, while recognizing the need and the efforts that need to be taken 
for capacity building, it is not necessary to treat it as an essential prerequisite. This 
would require well funded institution building and financing such a thing will be 
well worth looking into by the FC. 
  The recent finance commissions have also started on the path of performance 
tied funds (FRBM to name one). The time has seriously come to move from macro-
level indicators to design parameters at micro level. The quality of expenditure and 
delivery needs to be vetted through an autonomous well funded agency (at least on 
a sample basis). A lot is being done by the NGOs in terms of score cards for 
delivery thereby creating some capacity to do this. Also the effort has to be made 
to move from ad-hoc transfer (of say 25,000 crores INR) to compute the normative 
need of local bodies just as the earlier FC had done in the case of States. I am 
emboldened to suggest this because one of the Commission members has a great deal 
of expertise and work in the area (see Indira Rajaraman, 2003).  To be sure, this is 
asking a great deal, especially when the data base in this area even in the financial 
sphere is in a very bad shape. The issue of data has been discussed ad-nauseum by 
many scholars and is common knowledge (see e.g., Abhay Pethe and Mala Lalvani 
2005) and would be comical if it were not so serious.  Perhaps the 13
th FC needs to 
set up institutions (monitoring observatories/ data warehouses) afresh or virtually set 
them up by culling the elements from the existing ones (research 
institutes/universities).  
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th FC 
With twelve commissions having already reported the platform is well set with 
the obvious constraint that one cannot deviate drastically from what has gone by. At the 
same time, it is also important that the 13
th FC must approach the issues with an open 
mind (if not with a clean slate) and bearing in mind the changed scenario rather than 
just tinkering at the fringes. The maturing of issues and our understanding aso means 
that many of the issues – in the context of the work to be done by the 13
th FC, within 
the parameters set by the given ToR – present themselves as trade-offs. We consider 
some of these issues in what follows. 
 
V.1.  Finance Commission and Planning Commission 
In contrast to the Finance Commission which is a child of the Constitution, the 
Planning Commission is almost an object of faith of politicos. Whilst I believe in the 
historically contingent character of categories and institutions – and so I am not one to 
look back in anguish – I cannot but help believe that in the current situation, its waiting 
room character apart, its sell-by date is over! With the changing macro-management 
ethos, the role of the state as well a review of fiscal federalism becomes necessary 
(Govinda Rao and Tapas Sen (1996)). As Raja Chelliah (1991) noted, ‘Comprehensive 
central planning involving centralized decision making in relation to product and 
disposal of resources in the ‘national interest’ is the negation of true federalism’. 
The non-synchronous temporal tenures of the two commissions will lead to 
several problems and issues. The uncertainty with regard to resources to the states over 
the entire period is one of them. The prevailing practice of treating Plan and Non-Plan 
requirements of the states by the Planning Commission and the Finance Commission 
has led to the inability to take a coordinated and holistic view. Indeed, given that action 
by either has implications for the other has meant that they (FC and PC) have 
sometimes worked at cross purposes (see, Govinda Rao and Tapas Sen 1996). It is a 
happy coincidence that Kelkar (2004) the Chairman of the 13
th FC, is on record stating 
that, ‘Plan Vs Non-Plan and Capital Vs Revenue need to be re-examined’. He will 
have to undertake the difficult task of recovering the ‘lost ground’. It may be worth 
recalling that there the Chairman of the 4
th FC had stated (Govinda Rao and Tapas Sen, 
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expenditures on Plan schemes, nor explicit bar on grants for Capital purposes’.   
However hesitancy on the part of FCs traditionally have led to it becoming explicit 
mandate in the 10
th FC. In the ToR of the 13
th FC there is direction for the FC to take 
into account the Gross Budgetary Support to Center and State Plans. This implies a 
subtle tilt in favor of the Planning Commission and that is a worrisome development for 
federalism (see, Mythili Bhusnurmath, 2007). Such a stipulation may lead to the 
subservience of the constitutional entity viz., FC to the ‘extra constitutional PC’ with 
its transfers becoming merely residual in character (see G.R. Reddy 2007). 
The Finance commission will have to put up a strong fight for the territory 
that is in grave danger of being encroached upon. This is especially important since, 
the politically weighted Planning Commission recommendations have implications in 
the domain of concern of the FC (for example the loan component of the plans give rise 
to interest payment liabilities, which are part of the non-plan revenue expenditure). The 
FC correctly mandated to look holistically at the requirements will have a larger part of 
its transfers ‘blocked’, thereby reducing its degrees of freedom. It is important to note 
that the Finance Commissions are by and large seen to be fair and rational whereas the 
plans are representative of the socio-political strategy of the government in office and 
hence susceptible to electoral cycle (see, N.K. Singh 2007). 
 
V.2.   Equity and Efficiency 
Economic reform must include substantial changes in the system of inter-
governmental fiscal relations, with the ultimate objective of substituting market 
discipline of State finances for the currently existing Central governmental controls. 
However in this connection no bailout policy is critical. If such a policy lacks 
credibility and as a consequence states prove reluctant to push ahead with reform, there 
would appear to be no alternative but to rely on tight borrowing restrictions combined 
with cuts in central government transfers as a disciplining mechanism (Hemming, 
Mates and Potter in Teresa Menasian, 1997). The current economic ethos clearly 
indicates that efficiency in the form of incentive compatibility (IC) in 
contracts/relations must assume primacy. Given the political economy considerations 
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the penal clause. There is also the need to consider the fact that we are in an era of 
‘competitive federalism’. It is however important to remember that application of this 
principle presumes the existence of ‘competitive equality’ in terms of initial capacities. 
If not proper policy mix has to be evolved to bring about equalization in the dynamic 
sense (especially where infrastructure and skill and revenue capacities are concerned) 
so that over a period there is a convergence. 
The conflict between equity and efficiency arises because over weighting of 
equity or need (as has been the case in India) creates serious disincentive for the better 
performing states. So that adequacy or need have to be treated in a normative sense so 
as to discourage laziness (see, Abhay Pethe and Mala Lalvani, 2003) and instill a level 
playing field in terms of ‘stocks’ rather than just flows in the static frame. This can be 
done by measuring the need in terms of both stocks (infrastructure and capacity 
backlogs) and flows (income-distance). Similarly in measuring efficiency the dynamic 
elements (marginal improvement of stocks as well as flows) need to be considered. 
This way at least one sided incentive compatibility is achieved.  That some of this is 
already being done by the recent commissions is welcome, but more needs to be done 
here to push efficiency to the center stage. The need of equity considerations is not just 
a matter of ethico-moral consideration but – even for a rapidly opening economy like 
India – post-Keyenes, is justified by sturdy economic sense. The power of this 
argument is enhanced manifold in a country like India when we take into consideration 
the issue of social harmony. One area where we believe more equitable measurement of 
equity based on need is in the application of ‘distance’. The weight assigned to the 
‘distance’ criterion needs to be reduced. After all, population, area, as well as distance 
go to serve the concern of equity. In order to push for a greater space for efficiency 
whilst keeping in view equity and adequacy, it may be prudent to get back the recently 
discarded ‘inverse distance’ criterion. As is known, such a criterion leads to the 
‘tragedy of middle classes’ but will emphasize the case of both the extreme cases.  A 
more radical suggestion will be to take the cause of decentralization seriously and treat 
district as a primary unit for administration, use the distance criterion at the level of 
district level income. By way of illustration, if we consider the case of Maharashtra – 
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national level average performance in terms of per capita income. Indeed, removal of 
Mumbai (two districts) from reckoning leads to a drop in the per capita income of 
around 30%! Given that such high performing (concentrated areas – cities) are always 
ignored in any transfer on count of need, the aforesaid argument gains even more 
substance. This is pertinent since the macro level caps (on say the revenue deficits) lead 
to less than optimal expenditure on public goods in the poorer parts of the state. This is 
one of the reasons for potentially dangerous, periodic outbursts for separate identities! 
 Thus, despite a real trade off here, what I would like to see is, one the ‘need’ 
to be measured properly and two, a greater weight for efficiency variables (measured 
both for stocks and flows in static and dynamical frame).  
 
V.3.  Autonomy and Tied Transfers 
As already mentioned, the Indian Union has a centripetal bias. The fiscal federal 
structure is kept in place by a web of commissions and councils to form a frame that is 
workable. There is a perception (not without reason) that states and the lower 
governments are unable to competently discharge the functions assigned to them. This 
has led to a number of subjects being shifted to the concurrent list. Also the allocation 
has been altered so as to make the funds for the program directly or on shared basis. 
Over the past few FCs, the share of transfers as a proportion of the total transfers has 
shown a monotonic increase. From the 7
th FC when it was around 7% it has grown to 
around 18% in the latest FC. There are heavy pros and cons about this movement that 
are common knowledge and need not detain us here. The non-formulaic has a greater 
tendency to be used as a tool of political (not in the best sense) negotiation. This is 
especially so in the current political landscape that presents itself in India. On the other 
hand, the need of the hour is to be able to be an active rather than a passive fund 
manager. This is required to ensure quality of expenditure and best practices at the State 
level. Given that such constraints can be imposed only on the transfer component rather 
than the statutory tax sharing one, it is but natural that this component will increase. 
Applying an index (admittedly all the indices that I have seen are rather simple, as yet) 
for quality of governance reveals a surprisingly strong positive correlation between 
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(1998). There is of course the low level of administrative capacity at the lower levels to 
contend with. The trick here is to have a self binding commitment in terms of upper 
bound on the proportion to be so disbursed and then work in as detailed a way to tie 
the transfers to ‘good governance’ articulated in observable indicators. This is one 
more reason why we believe that the FC’s job is not of the ‘fill it and forget it’ variety 
and hence the FC must not be a self dissolving entity but retain its core entity for the 
entire term of five years. In doing this there will be encroachment on the autonomy of 
the States and it will not be easy given the fractured polity of the present. But the FC 
must try to push limit of possibility outwards. There is inherent in such an argument 
that one is willy-nilly creating a Frankenstein. We must then pin our hope on the ever 
strengthening force of the fourth estate and civil society.  
 
V.4.  Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
One of the important issues that the 13
th FC has been asked to look at is the 
impact of GST (since the year of its proposed commencement fall within the time 
period of its term). Although the reason for looking at its impact on foreign trade is not 
entirely clear. It is again propitious that Dr. Kelkar (2002) who headed the Task force 
for Indirect Tax reforms is the Chairman of this Commission. The grand bargain has 
been worked out where all the states will concurrently tax all the goods and services in 
a dual mode. The rates scenarios too have been suggested. It is argued that the dual 
GST (which in a sense deemed to be the culmination of tax reforms) will minimize the 
cost of compliance, with the presumption that the administrative and IT infrastructure 
will be synchronized and clearing house mechanism will be in place. Detailed empirical 
analysis (by the Task Force) is said to lead to the conclusion that there will be a 
substantial increase in the flow of funds to the state (with the pious hope or an expected 
caveat that this additional expenditure will be spent on Health and Education).  
One of the good points about this scheme is that having decided that the taxes 
will be destination based will remove the complications of tax exportation to a great 
extent. However there are several conditions that will have to be fulfilled before the 
stage is set for GST to become realistically implemented (See, Mythili Bhusnurmath 
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these will provide substantial hurdles of framework, will and capacity. The CMs are in 
the process of negotiating and seem to be arriving at a consensus yet the messiest part 
of elimination of all other levies seems to be unresolved (See, Business Standard (edit) 
2007). The rates envisaged are also contentious as they seem to be on the higher side 
when compared with the prevailing prices internationally. More moderate rates around 
10% will have to be considered (see, Govinda Rao 2007) with the help of more detailed 
studies. Also, whether constitutional amendment is required (for unification of cenvat 
and retail stage cenvat) is a moot point. The states would have to follow the prescribed 
rates leading to the erosion of their autonomy and yet coordination and creation of 
common market may require such a prescription. The actual rates not being available 
the 13
th FC Commission will have to take a call in a simulated environment. As pointed 
out by Govinda Rao (2007), there are likely to be various centre-state and interstate 
issues (including adjucation) that will arise and hence require resolution through a 
permanent instrumentality of a ‘clearing house’ for this purpose. There are many road-
blocks to over power as well as miles to traverse even before one can realistically move 
over to the GST regime (see Srivasta, D.K (2007) amongst others).  
Thus, the 13
th FC has to apply itself seriously and scientifically to study (in a 
scenario framework) the revenue implications of different reasonable rates at the 
central and state levels and come up with ceilings and floors (especially for the 
states). Hopefully, the state CMs committee will reach some consensus before the 13
th 
FC report is submitted! Implications will also have to be worked out about the extent 
to which the hands of the state governments can be tied (thereby reducing their 
autonomy). Indeed, the role of the FCs will have to undergo a change in terms of the 
magnitude and structure of sharing contingent on the pattern of tax revenues 
accruing. 
 
V.5.  Some Further Issues 
Let us now turn to some other issues (not dealt with above) related to design and 
criteria of devolution amongst other things. The underlying belief here is that the design 
structure (including the weighting pattern) is important not just for the shares or 
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sends about the underlying intent articulated through the criteria that are used and the 
possible dynamic impact it will have with changing scenario. 
Normally the quid pro quo argument does not apply to fiscal federal transfers; 
indeed it cannot. The nature of current growth, as is known, is such that it is essentially 
driven by urban agglomerations. These concentrated areas are potent revenue sources 
for the treasury at the central as well as the state level (see, Abhay Pethe and Mala 
Lalvani, 2007). In order for the non-homothetic growth to be sustained, at least till such 
time that it becomes inclusive in terms of sectors and space, it might be prudent for 
these areas to be compensated. Whilst it is true that there are other instrumentalities for 
urban infrastructure finance (viability gap funding through JNNURM), the FC must 
also do its bit so that an act of omission on its part does not lead to killing the golden 
goose! Such transfers to the local bodies in the areas must be fully incentive-
compatible, in that, they must meet the rigorous standards of rationalization of 
user fees, demand recovery and expenditure efficiency in a demonstrable manner. 
Two of the important issues that should have found an explicit place in the ToR 
of the 13
th FC are the impact of the Sixth Pay Commission and Royalties payable to 
the States.  The first especially since the GST finds a place which will be implemented 
later in time and the second especially in the context of the dropping of the clause 
related to the petroleum profits. The experience of the 5
th Pay Commission and its 
impact on the State finances is recent enough to be fresh in the memory of all 
concerned. The 6
th Pay Commission award is on the door step and one can ignore its 
implication only at one’s peril (unless its consideration is to be subsumed under 
Calamity and Disaster Fund!). Some estimation of the financial implications has to 
be worked out in this context so as to provide a realistic backdrop to the design of 
transfers. Critical events like this can alternatively be treated by keeping the 
award for subsequent years ‘open’, as in the Canadian case (see, 12
th FC Report, 
2005). This further strengthens our argument for having a core FC in existence for 
five years! 
I have argued fervently for incentives for efficiency so in that context, and in 
the name of fairness, it is essential that proper compensation be paid to the States 
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precisely the ones that are economically poor, so that such a tenet also helps taking care 
of equity concern ‘properly’. Further it is common knowledge that the royalty rate paid 
to the have not increased commensurately with the increase of the prices of these 
resources. The revenue base of these states can and should be improved through 
compensation on this count. This will go a long way in satisfying the concerns of 
equity. To be sure, the 12
th FC had done a bit by converting the rates on ‘ad-valorem’ 
basis but more need to done in terms of revising the rates themselves. With the help of 
a proper study, the rates will have to be revised in a fair manner. An effort in this 
context will go a long way in terms of alleviating the feeling of being ‘cheated’ by 
states like Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh and Jharkhand. 
Finally, given that the share of the taxes to be devolved to the states is limited, 
the increase in magnitude (which is surely required) must come from increasing the tax 
kitty. Given the general tendency towards softening of tax rates – thanks to supply side 
philosophy – and the imperative need to expand the tax base I would merely hint at a 
greater usage of presumptive tax using the 1/6 criterion for this purpose, (an old 
favorite of my colleague Ajit Karnik) even though it may not strictly fall within the 
purview of the FC. I will desist mentioning the old ticklish issue of Agricultural Tax 
(see Chelliah Raja (1993). There is however a potential problem brewing. The 
emergence as SEZs as a strategy for sustainable growth means – constitutional validity 
apart – there will be a serious erosion of the ability of the local bodies to raise resources 
from these areas. This is unfortunate and some way will have to be found to 
compensate the local bodies within whose geographical areas these SEZs fall, for the 
forgone opportunity. Otherwise this will be a body blow to the effort of revenue raising 
efforts of the relevant local bodies. 
 
V.  In Conclusion 
 
For all the voluminous literature on the subject of intergovernmental transfers 
and its role (including changing role) in equalization variously interpreted and despite 
all the good work done by the Central Finance Commissions, it continues to be true that 
  31the transfers are mostly based on broad judgments rather than any objective criteria. 
Not surprisingly they have also continued to be controversial. The frame of reference 
has further set to change – e.g., from macro caps via micro design to macro stability – 
but there is the general feeling – thanks to the work of Buchanan – that has prevailed, 
that fine tuning can do only that much and the residual violation of equalization will 
remain. It is also clear that in the changed macro-management ethos and the parametric 
environment, greater coordination between governments at various levels is called for 
in the interest of the well being of our polity, economy and society in general, and 
retaining the strength of the federal character of our union in particular. 
Finally, to return to a familiar theme, in all that FC does, even more important 
than the resources, will be the ability to design transfers within an operational 
framework of good governance. After all, as Thomas Friedman has said in his justly 
famous book, ‘The World is Flat’, ‘once the wholesale reforms by way of prerequisites 
have been accomplished, what is important is to get urgently into the business of reform 
agenda concerned with the micro-design’ (emphasis added). The successive finance 
commissions have succeeded in fitting the macro-caps, now the challenge is to cross 
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(18 Non-Special Category States) 
 










  As Per cent of GSDP  As Per cent of GSDP 
Andhra 
Pradesh  27.04 1.83  4.28  42.24 0.02  3.00 
Bihar 68.03  4.05  6.94  73.14  1.13  10.40 
Chattisgarh 8.67  1.78  3.51  29.00  -3.41  2.90 
Goa 36.96  3.22  5.82  39.32  0.23  4.70 
Gujarat 29.89  5.45  5.27  36.18  -0.73  2.50 
Haryana 25.17  1.66  4.32  26.34  0.60  0.60 
Jharkhand -  -  -  39.83  2.03  9.80 
Karnataka 24.94 3.01  5.39  27.84 -1.48  2.80 
Kerala 34.83  3.37  4.22  39.95  4.33  6.10 
Madhya Pr.  34.94  3.65  4.21  43.94  -1.44  3.70 
Maharashtra 19.46  3.02 4.02  31.98  0.63  3.10 
Orissa 53.84  6.03  8.44  58.97  -1.06  1.30 
Punjab 40.78  4.74  6.22  47.76  1.89  4.80 
Rajasthan 39.93 4.14  6.28  51.15 -0.07  3.60 
Tamil Nadu  21.93  1.84  3.18  27.94  0.10  2.70 
Uttar 
Pradesh  40.00 3.25  5.20  41.73 -0.82  2.70 
West 
Bengal 37.09  5.64  7.51  46.72  3.20  4.50 























(Rupees in Lakhs) 
 
 
     






       2005-06     2006-07     2005-06   
 2006-07  




Receipts  22860.97 26020.4 23898.77 30766.11 11.33
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    25113.25 27192.08 28433.01 32938.38 14.84
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   





Receipts  187.71 212.76 264.07 277.92 26.32
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    722.92 777.23 943.99 1202.52 29.99
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  4302.75 4824.73 4691.47 5182.04 7.62
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    7566.6 8181.67 8409.27 12974.47 27.06
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  5786.56 6639.58 4083.08 4865.06 39.19
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    14113.83 15263.3 15324.59 19383.33 16.03
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   
Deficit/surplus  -8327.27 -8623.72 -11241.5 -14518.27 34.06










    2005-06     2006-07     2005-06   
 2006-07  




Receipts  4767.89 5302.57 5281.57 6751.36 16.66
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    4964 5362.71 5448.75 6954.42 17.36
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  1287.3 1517.19 1857.65 2100.42 29.27
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    1216.54 1321.02 1776.01 2039.12 33.41
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  17033.06 19762.08 19051.28 22511.74 11.43
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    16933.91 18314.83 21544.08 23071.4 21.01
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  9830.41 11299.64 11537.21 13537.18 15.69
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    7657.45 8351.07 10625.09 14021.65 34.75
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  1727.76 2034.22 2186.7 2398.34 18.32
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    4369.23 4687.86 5282.76 5839.08 18.54
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   
Deficit/surplus  -2641.47 -2653.65 -3096.06 -3440.74 19.22
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    2005-06     2006-07     2005-06   
 2005-06  
(RE)    
J & K 
 Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Receipts  1940.24 2204.3 2416.78 2506.79 16.35
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    5516.78 5926.42 8578.71 9272.95 35.89
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  4310.13 4801 4279.19 4561.66 3.75
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    4841.25 5258.31 6413.79 7052.52 24.98
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  19613.79 22990.44 22506.26 28184.69 15.89
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    17001.1 18472.98 22972.24 26727.4 28.54
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  12205.72 13987.51 10715.39 13043.83 11.09
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    15113.07 16403.2 15208.19 21697.14 17.26
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   
Deficit/surplus  -2907.35 -2415.69 -4492.8 -8653.31 56.75
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    2005-06     2006-07     2005-06   
 2005-06  




Receipts  11170.83 12710.06 11322.9 12501.73 1.51
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    13150.41 14173.34 16351 17271.6 18.77
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  36301.32 41825.79 39475.3 45646.22 8.21
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    36228.24 39221.78 46974.45 54096.53 25.29
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  183.72 209.79 171.42 275.92 17.69
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    1323.15 1429.96 1610.89 1739.27 17.82
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  405.58 455.68 398.66 441.52 2.58
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    1121.51 1203.11 1182.91 1282.39 5.71
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   
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Actuals   RMSPE
    2005-06     2006-07     2005-06   





Receipts  114.87 131.34 175.15 182.88 31.45
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    1323.15 1429.96 1610.89 1739.27 17.82
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  193.84 219.19 202.34 203.37 6.25
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    1427.97 1532.18 1784.72 1784.72 13.50
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  5548.12 6290.15 6534.17 7605.99 16.23
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    10755.59 11563.12 11490.79 13745.91 12.11
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  9898.41 11281.51 13525.69 15635.52 27.34
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    12643.09 13564.1 17247.78 20562.8 30.59
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   
Deficit/surplus  -2744.68 -2282.59 -3722.09 -4927.28 42.25
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    2005-06     2006-07     2005-06   
 2005-06  




Receipts  11162.89 12873.77 12617.89 14498.24 11.37
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    16261.39 17540.38 18367.67 21418.46 15.15
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  203.89 227 1137.29 1175.5 81.38
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    478.27 511.71 1473.43 1572.2 67.50
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  23047.06 26604.55 25926.77 30946.66 12.65
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    23833.02 26064.9 26873.21 32622.73 16.31
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  487.43 557.9 359.7 424.3 33.56
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    1920.68 2070.26 1979.16 2107.79 2.44
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   
Deficit/surplus  -1433.25 -1512.35 -1619.46 -1683.49 10.85
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Receipts  22046.53 25395.88 21788.22 29791.46 10.47
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    34494.83 37140.59 40172.33 46685.15 17.57
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   




Receipts  2004.19 2276.52 2434.64 2978.78 20.84
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    3975.79 4323.92 4214.66 4919.33 9.45
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   





Receipts  16258.38 19211.83 11407.19 13742.31 41.19
  
 Total Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure    25150.49 27205.82 26822.72 30226.66 8.33
  
 PRE. DEVO. 
NON-PLAN 
REV.   

















  43APPENDIX III 
                                                               Population in Thousands 
State-wise Decennial Growth of Population by Census in India 
 
States/UTs 1971  1981  1991  2001 
India  548160 683329 846303 1027015 
Andhra Pradesh  43503 53551 66508 75728 
Arunachal Pradesh (1) 468 632 865 1091 
Assam 14625 18041 22414 26638 
Bihar 56353 69915 86374 82879 
Chhattisgarh* - - - 20796 
Goa 795 1008 1170 1344 
Gujarat 26697 34086 41310 50597 
Haryana 10036 12922 16464 21083 
Himachal Pradesh  3460 4281 5171 6077 
Jammu & Kashmir 4617 5987 7719 10070 
Jharkhand** - - - 26909 
Karnataka 29299 37136 44977 52734 
Kerala 21347 25454 29099 31839 
Madhya Pradesh  41654 52179 66181 60385 
Maharashtra 50412 62783 78937 96752 
Manipur 1073 1421 1837 2389 
Meghalaya 1012 1336 1775 2306 
Mizoram 332 494 690 891 
Nagaland 516 775 1210 1989 
Orissa 21945 26370 31660 36707 
Punjab 13551 16789 20282 24289 
Rajasthan 25766 34262 44006 56473 
Sikkim 210 316 406 540 
Tamil Nadu  41199 48408 55859 62111 
Tripura 1556 2053 2757 3191 
Uttaranchal*** - - - 8480 
Uttar Pradesh  88342 110863 139112 166053 
West Bengal 44312 54581 68078 80221 
Andaman & Nicobar Islands 115 189 281 356 
Chandigarh 257 452 642 901 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli  74 104 138 220 
Daman & Diu  63 79 102 158 
Delhi 4066 6220 9421 13783 
Lakshadweep 32 40 52 61 
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  45